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The New Zealand Superannuation Fund is being established as a means of smoothing 
out the impact on the rest of the Crown’s finances of the transition that will take place 
over the next fifty years to a permanently higher proportion of the population being 
eligible for New Zealand Superannuation, the universal pension paid to New 
Zealanders over the age of 65.  This paper discusses the financial issues surrounding 
the determination of the contributions that the Government would be required to make 
to the Fund over time in order to meet this objective.  The calculation of the required 
contribution rate is derived as a function of future expected  entitlement payments, 
future expected nominal GDP, future expected investment returns, and the Fund 
balance.  Estimation issues are discussed and the implications of volatility in 
investment returns are examined.  Some issues in assessing long-term expected 
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Financing New Zealand Superannuation 
Introduction 
The New Zealand Superannuation Fund is being established as a means of smoothing 
out the impact on the rest of the Crown’s finances of the transition that will take place over 
the next fifty years to a permanently higher proportion of the population eligible for New 
Zealand Superannuation.  This paper discusses the financial issues surrounding the 
determination of the contributions that the Government would be required to make to the 
Fund over time in order to meet this objective. 
 
The next section provides an overview of the policy underlying the establishment of the 
Fund.  This is to set the scene for the subsequent sections that address the calculation of 
the contribution rate and its practical estimation.  An appendix to this paper summarizes 
the range of approaches taken and views put forward regarding the levels of returns to 
expect from financial markets in the long-term.  Frances and McCulloch (2001) provides a 
more general and detailed description and analysis of the whole policy underlying the 
establishment of the Fund. 
Pre-Funding New Zealand Superannuation: Policy Overview 
Like that of many countries, New Zealand’s population is ageing.  Figure 1 illustrates how 
the proportion of the population over the age of sixty-five is expected to increase from 
12% to 27% over the next fifty years.  This is partly due to the ‘baby boom’ generation 
passing through life, but the increase also reflects the effects of increasing longevity, 
falling fertility and later child-bearing.  As a result, it is expected that this will be a 
permanent shift to an older population structure.  A related feature of the demographics is 
that the working age population falls from 65% to 59% over this time period.
1  So, loosely 
speaking, while there are about five workers per retiree now, there will be about two 
workers per retiree by 2050.  The implied dependency ratio is not without historical 
precedent.  The total dependency ratio ([retired + youth]/working-age) increases from 50% 
now to 70% by 2050, which is about the same as it was in the 1950s when the youth 
                                                 
1 “Working age” is defined for this analysis as ages 1 5 to 64 to be consistent with typical 
international analyses.  Other age ranges give a similar overall picture.   2
population included the baby boomers.  The difference is that the forthcoming increase 
appears to be a permanent change in the population age structure, rather than a transitory 
peak. 
 
New Zealand Superannuation is a universal pension paid to all eligible New Zealanders 
over the age of sixty-five.  The level of payment is based on the national average earnings 
level and is not subject to individual means-testing.
2  Figure 2 shows the expected track of 
New Zealand Superannuation payments, under current policy, as a proportion of New 
Zealand nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
3  Reflecting these demographic 
changes, it increases from around 4% now to over 9% by 2050.  The purpose of 
establishing the New Zealand Superannuation Fund is to help the Crown’s finances to 
adjust to this permanently higher proportion of national income that is expected to be 
devoted to New Zealand Superannuation payments.  The Government would be required 
to make contributions each year to a Fund managed on a commercial basis by an 
independent board.  For the first few decades, the contributions would need to be enough 
to cover the annual cost of New Zealand Superannuation, along with an additional annual 
capital contribution to build up the Fund to help finance the transition to the higher future 
cost of New Zealand Superannuation.  This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
The level of required contribution for the next year would be calculated annually by the 
Treasury during the Budget process, following the legislated formula, which is examined 
further below.  In the normal course of events, this would be the amount the Government 
would actually contribute to the Fund in the following year.  Like the Government’s fiscal 
objectives regarding debt levels and the operating surplus, the required contribution rate 
becomes another constraint on Budget decision-making.  In the same way that any 
departures from the fiscal objectives are subject to the transparency provisions of the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, failure to meet the required contributions to the New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund will require full public disclosure and explanation.  The 
analyses underlying the 2000  and 2001 Budgets indicated that the fiscal objectives would 
continue to be met for the foreseeable future after the introduction of the Fund. 
                                                 
2 Although it is not subject to means-testing of individuals, the payment rate does vary slightly, 
depending on individual domestic arrangements (married, single living alone, single sharing 
accommodation).  Further, the payments are treated as taxable income so are taxed according to 
the progressive income tax scale.  Additional means-tested benefits are provided, but these are 
generally not age-related and they are not financed through the Fund. 
3 The GDP projections referred to throughout this paper are on a nominal basis.  The illustrations 
use projections of GDP extracted from the Treasury’s Long-Term Fiscal Model.  Woods (2000) 
describes the methodology underlying the projections.   3
Calculation of the Annual Contribution Rate 
The smoothing algorithm stated in the legislation for the rate of contribution to the Fund is 
to annually set the required contribution for the next year at the level that, if that same 
proportion of forecast nominal GDP was made to the Fund each year for the succeeding 
forty years, the Fund balance plus accumulated returns would be expected to be sufficient 
to meet entitlement payments over those forty years.
4 
 
When the rate is reviewed each year, the same calculation would apply, but the forecasts 
of entitlements and GDP would roll along to reflect the moving time horizon (with any 
adjustments required to reflect changes in expectations about future GDP, entitlement 
payments and Fund returns), and the fund balance is updated to reflect actual investment 
performance over the past year.  So, if we seek to calculate what the required contribution 
rate is expected to be in j years’ time, it is necessary to solve the following equation for kj: 
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where 
E0[…]  =  expected value given information available at the beginning of year 1. 
Bj-1  =  Fund balance at the beginning of year j. 
H  =  time horizon for the calculation.  This is set at forty years. 
rt  =  rate of return on the Fund in year t. 
kj  =  contribution rate as a proportion of GDP. 
Gt  =  nominal GDP for year t. 
Pt  =  forecast entitlement payments in year t. 
gt  =  annualised return on the Fund in year t to reflect the fact that entitlement 
payments are made in fortnightly instalments.  If it is assumed that expected 
returns accrue evenly over the year, then: 


















ft  =  annualised return on the Fund in year t to reflect the pattern in which 
contributions are received by the Fund during the year.  If (as currently 
anticipated) contributions are made in fortnightly instalments in line with 
entitlement payments, then ft=gt. 
                                                 
4 The use of forty years in the legislation is essentially arbitrary.  The choice affects the extent to 
which the funding of entitlement payments is smoothed over time (see Figure 4).  At its limits, a 
time horizon of one year would be equivalent to continuing the existing pay-as-you-go scheme and 
no Fund would build up, while an infinite time horizon would result in a constant contribution rate 
approaching 7% of GDP.   4
 
In words, Equation (1) specifies that, for the contribution rate that is expected to apply to 
year j (kj), the expected value of: 
•  the opening Fund balance at the start of year j (end of year j-1), with returns 
compounded over the time horizon:  ( ) ￿
=
- + - +
H
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plus 
•  the contribution receipts in each year of the time horizon (H years starting from year 
j) at a constant contribution rate of kj, taking into account the within-year payment 
pattern and compounded for the remainder of the time horizon:  
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minus 
•  the entitlement payments in each year of that time horizon, taking into account the 
within-year disbursement pattern and compounded for the remainder of the time 
horizon:  ( ) ( ) ￿ ￿
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equals zero. 
 
The estimated level of the total contribution in year j would be kjGj and the Fund would be 
meeting Pj in entitlement payments, so the estimated required capital contribution (or 
withdrawal, if negative) would be equal to kjGj minus Pj. 
 
Assumptions 
Two main assumptions are required in order to solve Equation (1) to give an expression 
for the expected value of kj: 
 
•  Future GDP and future entitlement payments are both uncorrelated with returns on 
the Fund. 
•  Returns on the Fund are serially uncorrelated. 
Neither of these assumptions needs to hold perfectly in order to solve Equation (1).  
However, the discussion of each below indicates that they are at least approximately true. 
   5
Expected returns not correlated with GDP and demographics 
First, future GDP and future entitlement payments (that is, the series for which Gt and Pt 
are the expected values) are both assumed to be uncorrelated with the returns on the 
Fund (rt).  Consider first the relation between GDP and returns on the Fund.  The returns 
on the Fund will be driven by world capital market returns.  While New Zealand GDP is 
clearly not independent of the global economy, there is no obvious relation between world 
annual capital market returns and the level of New Zealand’s annual GDP that would give 
rise to a material statistical correlation (neither contemporaneaous nor lagged).  Such a 
correlation would only arise if the product of unexpected world returns (that is, the 
deviation from expected returns for a year) and unexpected New Zealand GDP (that is, 
the deviation from expected GDP for a year) is expected to be significantly different from 
zero.  This is not observed empirically, as indicated by the poor performance of such 




Turning to future entitlement payments, these are a function of national average earnings 
(which are closely related to GDP and hence not expected to give rise to a correlation for 
the same reason as above) and the size of the population entitled to receive New Zealand 
Superannuation.  There is some debate as to whether capital market returns are affected 
by changes in population age structure (for example, see Brooks, 2000).  However, to the 
extent that such relationships are predictable, it would be reasonable to believe that 
market expected returns would reflect this.  Accordingly, a significant correlation (which 
relates to unexpected movements) between these variables would not be expected. 
 
The projections of future GDP and future entitlement payments (that is, the series of Gt 
and Pt) are assumed to be the expected values of these variables.
6 
 
Fund returns are serially uncorrelated 
Second, it is assumed that returns on the Fund are serially uncorrelated (that is, that the 
unexpected return in one year is independent of the rates of return realised in prior years).  
This is a standard market efficiency assumption.
7 
                                                 
5 Further, note that GDP (as opposed to Gross  National Product, GNP) reflects domestic 
production and does not include returns on overseas investment by New Zealanders. 
6 Although the forecasts that are used are intended to be central estimates, the actual distributions 
of these variables are unknown.  Their estimation is discussed below. 
7 It is easy to show that markets cannot be entirely efficient in equilibrium (for example, see Shiller, 
1984) and there is some evidence of autocorrelation in returns (Poterba and Summers, 1988).  
However, the pertinent assumption being made in this paper of random-walk price behaviour 
cannot be rejected at conventional statistical significance levels.   6
 
Solution 
Given the above assumptions, Equation (1) can be solved for E0[kj] as follows: 
[ ]
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where 
mt  =  E0[rt], the expected annual rate of return on the Fund in year t. 
nt  =  E0[gt].  Entitlement payments are made in fortnightly instalments so, assuming 
that (1+rt) is distributed lognormally
8 with mean (1+mt) and variance st
2:  
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m n . 
wt  =  E0[ft].  If contributions are received fortnightly, then wt=nt. 
 
E0[Bj-1] =  the Fund balance that is expected (as at the end of year 0) for the beginning of 
year j. 
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where 
At  =  the actual contributions expected (as at the end of year 0) to be made in year t. 
 
In the normal course of events, At would equal ktGt.  However, it may be anticipated that, 
in some years, there will be deviations from the required contribution level.  For example, 
there might be additional capital contributions, or other fiscal priorities might require a 
lower contribution level, or the Government might establish policies that prescribe 
minimum and/or maximum levels for the contribution to the Fund.  To the extent that these 
are predictable at year 0, At would differ from ktGt. 
 
Equation (2) can be described in words as the present value of entitlement payments over 
the time horizon minus the opening Fund balance, all divided by the present value of GDP 
over the time horizon, with discounting of entitlements and GDP being at the expected 
                                                 
8 The assumption that (1+r t) is lognormally distributed is based on the central limit theorem and the 
independence of daily returns.   7




The level of contribution to be made to the Fund would be required to be recalculated 
each year.  So, each year, Equation (2) is to be calculated with j=1: 
 
( ) ( )































  (4) 
 
The Treasury would be required to report the amount of the required annual capital 
contribution for the next year (that is, the amount k1G1 minus P1) in the Budget Economic 
and Fiscal Update that is required to be produced under the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
1994 at the time of the Budget (that is, immediately before the start of the financial year).
10 
 
In addition, it is useful for fiscal planning to make projections of future contribution rates, 
using Equation (2) with j>1.  However, these are simply projections given current 
expectations about entitlement payments, GDP, and Fund investment returns.  They do 
not determine future contribution levels beyond the one year and, like any projections 
involving uncertainty, there would be widening confidence intervals around the expected 
levels as the projection period increases to reflect the uncertainty surrounding future 
levels of GDP, entitlement payments and Fund returns.  Projections of the Fund balance 
(based on Equation (3)) are also subject to uncertainty regarding future contribution rates, 
entitlement payment levels and Fund returns.  The effects of uncertainty on the 
projections of contribution rates and Fund balance are analysed further in the next 
section. 
                                                 
9 The use of the expected return on the Fund for discounting the projected entitlement payments 
and projected GDP is a mathematical result of deriving Equation  (2) from Equation  (1).  It is 
therefore appropriate for this rate calculation.  However, this does not imply that it would be 
appropriate to use the Fund’s expected rate of return to value the projected entitlement and 
projected GDP cashflow streams individually.  In that case, the discount rates chosen should reflect 
the risks inherent in those cashflow streams, independently of the investment strategy adopted for 
the Fund. 
10 In practice, the time line for preparation of the Budget would require the calculation to be carried 
out, and the contribution level finalised, two or three months before the start of the year.  The 
opening Fund balance (B0) will not be known with certainty at that time, but it ought to be able to be 
estimated with reasonable accuracy from the year-to-date results and short-term forecasts of 
returns for the remainder of the year.   8
Estimation 
Estimation of future contribution levels requires long-term forecasts of future nominal 
GDP, entitlement payments and Fund returns.  The assessment of the required capital 
contribution for the next year that the Treasury would be required to state in the Budget 
Economic and Fiscal Update requires forty-year projected series of each of these 
variables.  If projections of future contribution levels are to be made, even longer series 
are required.  For example, to project contribution levels over the next sixty years requires 
one hundred year projected series of GDP, entitlement payments and Fund returns.  Such 
long-dated projections, even the forty years needed just to determine next year’s 
contribution level, require bold assumptions to be made.  However, the fact that the 
contribution level is routinely reassessed each year means that the actual contribution 
levels will continually adjust to reflect changes in expectations about the long-term future. 
 
GDP 
Projections of future GDP are made routinely by the Treasury as part of the Budget 
process (Woods, 2000).  The Budget Economic and Fiscal Update prepared by the 
Treasury includes detailed forecasts for the next four years. The Budget Fiscal Strategy 
Report produced for the Government extends the assumptions to produce ten-year 
“progress outlooks” and indicative fifty-year “scenarios”, in which nominal GDP is 
assumed to grow in line with labour productivity, projected changes in the labour force, 
and inflation.  For projections beyond the fifty years, the fifty-year assumptions are 




Total annual payments of New Zealand Superannuation are influenced by demographic 
trends and nominal wage levels.  The demographic trends are based on Statistics New 
Zealand population projections with medium fertility, medium mortality and net migration 
of 5,000 per year.  The demographic projections span one hundred years.  Nominal wage 
levels are projected as a function of labour productivity and inflation.  The demographic 
and wage level assumptions used are the same as those adopted throughout the Budget 
                                                 
11 The 2000 Budget Fiscal Strategy Report also included some analyses using a scenario of lower 




The projections are based on currently legislated policies for entitlement payments 
continuing into the future.  The projections are therefore conditional on continuation of 
existing policy.
13  This is an unavoidable feature of Budget-related projections.  While it is 
inconsistent with the dynamic nature of policy evolution over time, it has the advantage of 
making clear the implications for future government finances of continuing with existing 
policies, and it provides a basis for evaluating the implications of policy changes (for 
example, alternative entitlement parameters). 
 
The contribution rate calculation is made as a proportion of GDP.  As a result, the 
absolute levels of projected GDP and entitlement payments are not as critical as their 
relative levels.  Since nominal wage growth is closely related to nominal GDP growth, 
changes in the relative levels of GDP and entitlement payments are driven primarily by 
demographic trends and, in particular, by the projected number of people eligible for New 
Zealand Superannuation.  Since all of the people who will be eligible for New Zealand 
Superannuation over the next sixty-five years have already been born,
14 their numbers 
can be predicted relatively accurately. 
 
Expected Fund Returns 
The net returns obtained on the investment of the Fund balance will depend on the 
investment strategy adopted by the Board, long-term returns in the asset classes adopted, 
management expenses and income tax paid.  These are discussed further below. 
 
Investment Strategy and Long-Term Returns 
The Board of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund would be required to “invest the 
                                                 
12 Where a longer series of entitlement projections than 100 years is required (for example, to 
illustrate the path of future contribution rates beyond sixty years into the future), entitlement 
payments are presumed to become a constant proportion of GDP.  Of course, in reality it will not be 
exactly constant.  If nothing else, there would be some autoregressive ripples as the baby 
boomers’ offspring age.  However, this is over a century away and a whole range of events could 
occur in the meantime so this assumption is as good as any. 
13 If the legislation provided for specific change over time (for example, to change the age of 
eligibility gradually over a number of future years), this would be treated as ‘existing policy’ (that is, 
the eligibility age would be assumed to follow the legislated track, rather than be assumed to stay 
at its current level).  In this way, the effects of current policy decisions that affect future entitlement 
levels do feed immediately into current contribution levels. 
14 This is assuming that the eligibility age stays at 65.  With life expectancy now in the mid-70s and 
increasing, most of the recipients of New Zealand Superannuation over the next century are 
already alive.  If the eligibility age were to be raised, or if immigration were to increase markedly, 
the “now-alive” would be an even larger proportion of future recipients.   10
Fund on a prudent, commercial basis and, in doing so, must manage and administer the 
Fund in a manner consistent with best-practice portfolio management; and maximising 
return without undue risk to the Fund as a whole; and avoiding prejudice to New Zealand's 
reputation as a responsible member of the world community.” (New Zealand 
Superannuation Bill, clause 58(2)) 
 
Given this mandate, and given the long-term nature of the Fund, it is reasonable to expect 
that the Board would establish an investment portfolio that is widely diversified across 
world capital markets.  However, regardless of the actual investment strategy that is 
adopted, what levels of returns can be expected in world capital markets many decades 
out into the future is the subject of significant debate.  Issues arise surrounding the 
relevance of past historical returns for predicting the future, the effects of evolution and 
innovation in capital markets, consistency between expectations about capital market 
returns and expectations about the rate of long-term economic growth, and the effects of 
the demographic changes on capital markets.  These issues are discussed in more detail 
in the appendix to this paper.  While the balance of opinion seems to be that long-term 
returns in world equity and bond markets will be somewhat lower than those experienced 
in the recent past, there is no general consensus about the levels of expected future 
returns more than a few years ahead.  Private-sector forecasters rarely make projections 
of market returns more than ten years ahead and typically not much beyond five years. 
 
Management Expenses 
Management of the Fund’s investments would involve management expenses that will 
reduce the net returns of the Fund and so need to be taken into account when projecting 
the required contribution levels.  The levels and types of fees would depend on the 




The Fund is subject to tax on its investment income.
15  This tax is paid to the Crown.  This 
means that the Crown as a whole benefits from the gross investment returns (after 
management expenses) of the Fund, applying part of it (that is, the tax receipts from the 
Fund) to the rest of the Budget in the year the investment income is earned, and 
effectively reinvesting the remainder in the Fund until a capital withdrawal is made to help   11
finance entitlement payments.  As a result, any analysis of the implications of policies for 
the Crown as a whole (for example, the merits of alternative investment strategies for the 
Crown as a whole, or indeed the existence of the Fund at all) needs to take into account 
total returns (after management expenses), including tax receipts from the Fund. 
 
Although the Crown as a whole benefits from the gross investment income, the Fund only 
retains the after-tax returns.  This means that the contribution level required to finance 
New Zealand Superannuation through the Fund needs to be based on the after-tax 
returns of the Fund.  The effective tax rate will depend on how different income sources 
are taxed (for example: dividends versus capital gains; and local income versus overseas 
income which may have been subject to taxation in another jurisdiction).  This would be 
determined over time following the same law that applies to other taxpayers. 
 
In the illustrations given below, the tax rate is assumed to be 33%, which is the current 
corporate tax rate in New Zealand, and it is assumed to apply in the year the returns are 
earned.  Depending on the investment strategy adopted by the board, the average tax 




Figure 3 illustrates the projected path of contributions to the Fund using the projections of 
New Zealand Superannuation from Figure 2 and assuming an internationally diversified 
portfolio for the Fund with an expected annual pre-tax nominal return of 9.1% after 
management fees.
16  This example should be treated as an illustration and not as a 
particular view about the long-term expected returns of the Fund.
17  The Board of the 
Fund will determine its investment policy, and there is also significant uncertainty 
regarding how market rates of return in the various asset classes will evolve in the long-
term future.  Nonetheless, this level of expected annual returns is within the ballpark of 
likely expected returns and it provides a characterisation of the effects of the Fund that 
                                                                                                                                                    
15 The Fund will be subject to the same tax rules as other investors.  Should the tax regime change 
in the future, such changes would be expected to apply equally to the Fund. 
16 This is the average  annual return.  Assuming that returns are distributed lognormally, the 
expected compounded long-term return would be lower than this.  For example, assuming an 
annual standard deviation of 6.75%, a 9.1% annual return implies an expected compound return 
over 40 years of 8.86% per year. 
17 Further, it is not necessary to assume that expected returns are stationary over time ( mt in 
Equation (2) is a function of time so can vary).  The expected return could be modelled as changing 
over time to reflect factors such as a yield curve or predictable changes in the Fund's asset 
allocation over time.  However, the same general picture emerges.   12
applies across a wide range of levels of expected return. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the effect on the path of contribution rates if different assumptions are 
made about expected returns.  If a lower [higher] expected annual rate of return was to be 
assumed, the total required contribution (kj) line would shift up [down] slightly and its slope 
would be marginally lower [higher], but still converging eventually on the payments line.  
The cross-over from retaining capital contributions in the Fund to making capital 
withdrawals would occur slightly later [earlier]. 
 
Regardless of the assumption that is made about the level of expected returns, the path of 
total annual contributions to the Fund (that is, current year New Zealand Superannuation 
payments plus [minus] the retained capital  contribution [capital withdrawal]) starts at a 
higher level than New Zealand Superannuation payments alone and it is upward-
sloping.
18  Until the mid to late 2020s, there is a positive, but declining, annual capital 
contribution required to be retained to build up the Fund.  After that time, the Fund starts 
to be drawn upon to help finance the annual cost of New Zealand Superannuation 
payments.  Eventually, possibly sometime next century, the upward-sloping line 
converges on the path of New Zealand Superannuation payments as the Fund is drawn 
down to zero and the system reverts to pay-as-you go.  This highlights the fact that this is 
not an ongoing pension scheme.
19  Rather, it is a financing mechanism designed to 
smooth out the effect of the cost of New Zealand Superannuation on the rest of the 
Crown’s finances over time and, in particular, to ease the transition to a permanently 
higher level of expense. 
 
The overall result from the existence of the Fund is that the transition to the higher long-
term cost of New Zealand Superannuation is smoothed over time.  Instead of more than 
doubling from current levels of around 4% of GDP to around 9% of GDP over the next fifty 
years, the Fund requires a higher start of around 6% of GDP which then only increases by 
a third to 8% of GDP in that time. 
 
Effects of Uncertainty 
Projections of future levels of contributions and of the size of the Fund over time rely on 
                                                 
18 It is upward-sloping because the rolling forty-year moving-average of New Zealand 
Superannuation payments steadily increases. 
19 While not infinitely lived, this Fund could last for over a century.  If a fully perpetual fund was 
intended, it would be equivalent to setting the rolling horizon for this Fund infinitely large.  This 
would have the effect of moving immediately to the long-run average cost of New Zealand 
Superannuation which, under current policy, would be in the region of 9% of GDP per year.   13
expectations about future GDP, future entitlements and future Fund returns.  Sensible use 
of these projections requires some understanding of the uncertainty surrounding the 
expected values that are calculated.  Over long projection horizons, this uncertainty would 
be substantial. 
 
Projections of future New Zealand GDP and future New Zealand Superannuation 
entitlements do not have measures of volatility associated with them.
20  However, as 
noted above, the relative levels of these series are more important than their absolute 
levels.  The relative levels are primarily determined by demographic trends in the relative 
size of the population eligible for New Zealand Superannuation.  This can be predicted 
reasonably accurately over long periods.  As a result, the focus of attention on uncertainty 
can be placed on the volatility of the other main variable that affects the projections:  
investment returns to the Fund. 
 
Forecasting the volatility in annual investment returns many years into the future suffers 
from some of the same estimation problems as discussed above for expected returns, 
albeit to a lesser extent.  Nonetheless, estimates of volatility and of the shape of the 
distribution of returns
21 can be made drawing on empirical finance. 
 
The required contribution rate for a year depends partly on the Fund balance at the start 
of that year.  In turn, that Fund balance depends on past investment outcomes, past levels 
of contribution and past entitlement payments.  These complex interactions mean that an 
analytical expression that describes the distributions of future contribution rates or future 
fund balances cannot be derived.  However, given the distribution of returns for each year 




Figure 6 provides an illustration of confidence intervals surrounding the projected 
contribution rates over time.  It assumes that the Fund is invested in a market portfolio 
with expected pre-tax return after management expenses of 9.1% in each year and an 
                                                 
20 Measures of uncertainty in relation to demographic and social security projections in the United 
States have been developed. See Holmer (2001), Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998), Meyerson and 
Sabelhaus (2000).  Application to the New Zealand context is a possibility for future analysis. 
21 The central limit theorem can be used to show that, if daily returns are independent, annual 
returns (1+r) follow the lognormal distribution.  This is a relatively robust result. 
22 The simulation results presented here were produced using the Treasury’s Excel spreadsheet of 
the Fund (available from www.treasury.govt.nz) along with  @Risk (a simulation add-in for Excel 
from www.palisade.com).  The results graphed were based on 2,000 simulation runs.   14
annual standard deviation of 6.75%.
23  The distribution of the projected contribution rate 
does widen over time but stays relatively narrow.  This is because the contribution rate is 
recalculated each year taking account of past experience.  The confidence intervals 
actually become narrower toward the end of the century.  This is because the Fund 
balance is declining so the level of investment return (and hence its volatility) has a 
diminishing effect on the rate calculation.  Figure 7 presents the same information, 
highlighting the capital contributions to, and capital withdrawals from, the Fund. 
 
Figure 8 illustrates confidence intervals surrounding the projected Fund balance over time 
for the same return assumptions.  The Fund balance is subject to relatively wide 
confidence intervals.  Although the Fund is expected to peak at about 50% of GDP, a 
peak as high as 60% or as low as 40% is quite conceivable under these return 
assumptions.  The distribution widens over time because small deviations from expected 
returns compound quickly to have a dramatic effect on the wealth of the Fund.  This is not 
immediately offset by corresponding change in the contribution rate because that 
calculation is on the basis of a forty-year rolling horizon. 
 
There are some important caveats surrounding the illustrations presented in this paper: 
 
•  First, as noted above, the assumptions made about expected returns and volatility 
are intended simply to illustrate the general way the Fund will work.  The same 
qualitative effects are obtained across the range of plausible values for these 
variables. 
•  Second, the expected returns and volatility of returns of the Fund will depend to a 
large extent on the asset allocation strategy adopted by the board of the Fund, who 
had not been appointed when this paper was written.  The assumptions made for 
the purpose of the illustrations in this paper should not be regarded in any way as 
presenting a view about the Government’s expectations about future returns on the 
Fund or its asset allocation strategy.   
•  Third, expected returns and volatility are unobservable, and there is a variety of 
views about they will evolve in the future, especially in the long-term.  When it 
comes to calculating the contributions that actually will have to be made into the 
Fund, a robust process will be required to determine each year the forty-year series 
                                                 
23 These numbers for expected return and volatility have been chosen for illustrative purposes, 
reflecting a broadly diversified investment portfolio.  The effect of making different assumptions 
about expected returns is illustrated in Figure 5.   15
of future expected returns on the Fund to use in the calculation.   
•  Fourth, expectations will change over time as new information comes to hand and 
as the future becomes closer.  This makes the actual confidence intervals wider 
than in the illustrations given here, which assume that the parameters (means and 
volatilities) of the returns distributions of future periods years are known with 
certainty.   
•  Fifth, as noted above, only the volatility in Fund returns has been modelled.  There 
is also volatility in the other parameters, GDP and New Zealand Superannuation 
payments, that has not been modelled.   
•  Sixth, also as noted above, the illustrations are made on the basis of no changes in 
policy.  If the rules for New Zealand Superannuation are changed in the future (for 
example, the eligibility age, the eligibility criteria, the payment rate, the indexation to 
wages), the contribution rate calculation will then reflect the changed expectations 
about future expenditure.   
•  Seventh, the illustrations assume that, after the first three years of transition, exactly 
the full levels of contribution are made.  If the fiscal conditions for the Government 
were such that it decided to contribute less [more] than the calculated required rate 
in one year, then all future years’ required contributions would be higher [lower]. 
 
Smoothing Return Volatility 
The purpose of the establishment of the Fund is to smooth out over time the effect on the 
rest of the Crown’s finances of change in the level of annual New Zealand 
Superannuation expense.  Using the forty-year rolling horizon algorithm of Equation (1) 
produces a calculation of the contribution rate that is a function of the opening Fund 
balance and, hence, of volatile past returns (see Equation (4), noting that B0=B-1(1+r0)).  
As a result, if actual returns for the year are lower [higher] than expected returns (so that 
B0 is lower [higher] than E-1[B0]), then the contribution for the next year will need to be set 
at a slightly higher [lower] level than had been forecast (that is, k1 would need to be higher 
[lower] than E-1[k1]). 
One possible response would be to smooth over time the effect of return volatility on the 
contribution rate.  For example, this could be achieved by replacing the actual opening 
balance (B0) of Equation (4) with the expected balance (E-1[B0]) plus an averaged   16
proportion of past deviations from expected returns.  This is referred to by some as an 
“actuarial smoothing” approach.  An approach like this has not been adopted for two 
reasons. 
First, the effect of unexpected returns on the contribution rate is already relatively small.  
To see this, consider the sensitivity of the contribution rate to unexpected returns:
24 
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  (5) 
The accumulated present value of the next H years’ annual GDP, PV[G1…H], is a relatively 
large number.  Even when the Fund is at its height, maybe in the region of 50% of annual 
GDP, this translates into something in the region of only 2% of PV[G1…40] at that time.  At 
that rate, a deviation from annual expected return of as much as 1,000 basis points would 
imply a deviation from the (one-year-ahead) expected contribution rate of only 0.2% of 
GDP. 
The second reason for not adopting this response is that, while it might reduce the one-
year-ahead volatility in the contribution rate to some extent, it also introduces additional 
autocorrelation to the contribution rate series so that the contribution rate is slower to 
respond to changes in Fund wealth.  The effect of this is that confidence intervals around 
future contribution rates are much the same as without the actuarial smoothing, meaning 
that the long-term effectiveness of the Fund in smoothing the cost of New Zealand 
Superannuation is unchanged.  This can be seen by comparing Figure 7 with Figure 9, 
which has been prepared with the same assumptions as for Figure 7, except that 
deviations from expected returns are “smoothed” over five years in the contribution rate 
calculation.
25  The confidence bands are essentially the same. 
Conclusion 
This paper discussed the principles and issues surrounding the determination of the 
contributions that the Government would be required to make to the proposed New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund.  The level of contribution is required to be recalculated 
                                                 
24 PV[G1…H] is the sum of the present value of Gt, t=1…H, the denominator in Equation(4).  The 
time horizon, H, being used is forty years. 
25 To implement the smoothing, an autoregressive procedure was adopted, in which the deviations 
from expected returns are credited to an “actuarial smoothing account”.  Instead of the actual 
opening Fund balance, the rate calculation uses the expected Fund balance (E-1[B0]) plus one-fifth 
of the accumulated value of that  account.  The “one-fifth” fraction was chosen arbitrarily but 
apparently is typical.   17
each year on the basis that, if the same proportion of forecast GDP was made to the Fund 
each year for the succeeding forty years, the Fund balance plus accumulated returns 
would be expected to be sufficient to meet entitlement payments over those forty years.  
The calculation of the required rate is demonstrated and issues in making projections of 
the contribution rate and the Fund balance are discussed.  Making some standard 
assumptions, an analytical solution for calculating the expected contribution rate resulting 
from this prescription is presented.  It is a function of forecasts of expected GDP, 
expected payments of New Zealand Superannuation and expected returns on investment 
of the Fund.  Estimation of the paths of future contribution rates and of the size of the 
Fund over time are illustrated, and the effect of volatility in capital market returns is 
examined.   18
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Data Source:  The Excel spreadsheet used to produce the results reported in this paper is 

















































































































































Figure 1:  Projections of New Zealand Population Over 65 
 






















Figure 2:  New Zealand Superannuation as a Proportion of GDP 
 
Source:  New Zealand Treasury.  Based on Statistics New Zealand population projections (see Figure 1) using current entitlement provisions 



































Figure 3:  New Zealand Superannuation Fund Projected Contributions 
 
Source:  New Zealand Treasury New Zealand Superannuation Fund Model. 
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Figure 4:  Effect of Alternative Rolling Horizons on the Path of the Contribution Rate (kj) 
 






































Figure 5:  Effect of Different Assumptions About Expected Returns on the Path of the Required Contribution Rate (kj) 
 
Source:  New Zealand Treasury New Zealand Superannuation Fund Model. 








































Figure 6:  Variability Around the Contribution Rate (kj) Attributable to Volatility in Annual Investment Returns 
 
Source:  New Zealand Treasury New Zealand Superannuation Fund Model.   





































Figure 7:  Variability Around Capital Contributions and Withdrawals Attributable to Volatility in Annual Investment Returns 
 











































Figure 8:  Variability in the Fund Balance Attributable to Volatility in Annual Investment Returns 
 




































Figure 9:  Variability Around Capital Contributions and Withdrawals with Actuarial Smoothing 
 




Appendix:  Long-Term Returns 
Introduction 
The characteristics of financial asset and liability returns are becoming increasingly salient 
in fiscal and economic policy work.  Long-term fiscal modelling and policies that have 
long-term financial implications, such as the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, require 
assessments to be made about what financial returns we should expect decades out into 
the future.  However, there is a range of popular views about the likely state of financial 
markets in the long-term.  What effect will the ageing baby-boomers have?  Are current 
high market values supported by fundamentals?  Is history any guide? 
 
This appendix summarizes the range of approaches taken and views put forward on this 
issue.  Its purpose is to provide a basis for thinking about how these could be developed 
to the stage that useful conclusions can be drawn for application to long-term modelling 
and policy analysis. 
 
The next section examines the historical record of asset returns and the issues that arise 
in using these as a basis for extrapolating future returns.  Section 3 considers what the 
relations between current market values and other economic variables signal about future 
prices and returns.  Section 4 examines developments and trends in capital markets that 
could affect long-term returns and section 5 examines the effect of the future 
macroeconomy on prices and returns.  Section 6 analyses the implications of changing 
demographics.  Finally, section 7 makes some concluding observations. 
Historical Record 
Analysis of the historical record on returns to financial instruments focuses primarily on 
US data because this has provided the most long-lived continuous capital market.
1  The 
following table provides rates of return over the past 200 years. 
 
                                                 
1 Lally (2000) examines the relationship between the real cost of capital in New Zealand, Australia 
and the United States.  
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Equity returns have remained reasonably steady, while bond and bill returns have 





However, there are several difficulties with simply extrapolating this past series out to the 
future, especially the long-term future.  These difficulties include issues of nonstationarity, 
survivorship bias, degrees of freedom required for long-term return estimation, the “equity 




The above tables illustrate that average long-term returns have varied over time.  A 
prediction of future expected returns therefore will depend heavily on which past time 
period is used to form the prediction and the changes over time are not well understood 
(Siegel, 1999).  More recent data might be considered to be more relevant for future 




While it is convenient to focus on the US markets because of the long time series they 
provide, it does introduce the possibility of survivorship bias.  Survivorship bias occurs 
when a sample is not representative of a population because it only includes observations 
from entities which provide a complete time series over the sample period.  In this case, 
the US market happens to have survived over time while other countries’ capital markets 
have foundered.  Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) report that over the period 1921 to 1996, 
US equities had the highest real return among the 39 markets that go back to the 1920s, 
at 4.3 percent compared to a median of 0.8 percent for other countries.  They conclude 
that the high equity premium in the US has been an exception rather than the rule. 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
While a two hundred year series may seem like a healthy-sized sample for making 
projections of future expected returns, it is actually relatively short for projecting long-term 
returns.  For example, for projecting average returns over the next fifty years, it only 
provides only four independent past observations.  Of course, it is possible to take rolling 
averages through time (1901-50, 1902-51, 1903-52, etc.) but these are highly statistically 
dependent because they include so many overlapping years. 
 
An alternative approach would be to undertake the analysis based on the distribution of 
returns (even though these would inevitably have to be estimated on the basis of history), 
rather than on the actual historical returns.  Jones and Wilson (1999) adopt this approach 
to illustrate how the traditional wisdom based on historical returns is likely to overstate 
future investment performance. 
 
Equity Premium Puzzle 
The above table shows that the equity risk premium in the past 75 years has averaged 5 
to 7 percent.  The prevailing view seems to be that these levels will continue into the  
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future.  A 1999 survey of over 200 US economists found that most estimate the equity 
premium at 5 to 6 percent over the next thirty years (Welch, 1999, quoted in Siegel, 1999). 
 
The “equity premium puzzle” is that these levels of risk premium are too high to be 
explained by the standard models of risk and return without invoking unreasonably high 
levels of risk aversion.  Mehra and Prescott initially presented this finding in 1985.  In the 
intervening fifteen years various explanations have been attempted but none has been 
completely satisfactory.  This leaves some doubt as to whether the risk premium will stay 
at these historical levels, or will be somewhat lower, as suggested by Fama and French 
(2000).  Indeed, there is some evidence that the equity premium has already declined 
(Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina, 2001). 
 
Expected Returns versus Realized Returns 
Expected returns are not directly measurable.  As a result, realized returns are invariably 
used as a proxy for expected returns.  This is based on an assumption that arbitrage will 
result in  “surprises” (deviations between expected returns and realized returns) being 
zero-mean and unpredictable, in which case realized returns would provide an unbiased 
estimate of expected returns. 
 
However, this relationship does not hold well.  Elton (1999) illustrates this: “In the recent 
past, the United States has had stock market returns of higher than 30 percent per year 
while Asian markets have had negative returns.  Does anyone honestly believe that this is 
because this was the riskiest period in history for the United States and the safest for 
Asia?”  He also points to lengthy periods in history when equity returns and long-term 
bonds returns averaged less than risk-free rates. 
 
Later in this appendix, we discuss various developments that could lead to changes in 
return expectations in the future.  If a change occurred that resulted in investors requiring 
a smaller risk premium to invest in equities (for example, aggregate risk aversion drops, or 
transaction costs fall, or risk is shared more widely), the required rate of return on equities 
would fall.  The immediate effect of this would be that individuals would be more prepared 
to invest in equities, bidding the price up until the expected return fell to meet the required 
return.  However, in the meantime, the increase in price means that a higher realized 
return is observed. 
 
On this basis, the recent high growth in market prices (and hence high realized returns), 
as indicated in the graphs below, could well be quite consistent with low expected returns  
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for the future.   
Current Market Values 
Current US stock prices are high relative to various indicators.  This section examines the 
relations with earnings and with national income. 
 
Price-Earnings Ratio 
Average past earnings provide a measure of firms’ past ability to generate wealth, while 
stock prices reflect the market’s expectations about future earnings.  The price-earnings 
ratio therefore provides an indication of the match between past performance and 
expectations about the future. 
 
Figure 1.2 from Shiller (2000), reproduced below, shows the price-earnings ratio for the 
S&P Composite Stock Price Index over the past 120 years.  The graph shows that the 
current high level of this ratio is well outside its historic range.  This is primarily due to 
price increase:  earnings have followed a steady trend growth rate.  This has led various 
commentators to predict that prices are likely to scale back in future, resulting in low or 
negative returns, either with a sharp correction, as in 1929, or with a slow slide like the 






There are most likely several factors that have combined to produce the increasing prices.  
Shiller (2000) lists twelve factors that he believes have contributed to a self-fulfilling 
psychology of a roaring stock market: 
 
•  the arrival of the Internet coincidental with a time of solid earnings growth; 
•  triumphalism and the decline of foreign economic rivals; 
•  cultural changes favouring business success or the appearance thereof; 
•  a Republican Congress and capital gains tax cuts; 
•  the baby boom and its perceived effects on the market; 
•  an expansion of media reporting of business news; 
•  analysts’ increasingly optimistic forecasts; 
•  the expansion of defined contribution pension plans; 
•  the growth of mutual funds; 
•  the decline of inflation and the effects of money illusion; 
•  expansion of the volume of trade:  discount brokers, day traders, and twenty-four-
hour trading;  and 
•  the rise of gambling opportunities. 
 
A further factor leading to increasing price-earnings ratios over time is that the reporting of 
earnings has become more conservative over time (Givoly & Hayn, 2000).  As a result, a 
simple focus on the ratio time-series, as in the graph above, may overstate the growth in 
share price relative to the underlying income-generating capacity of firms. 
 
National Income 
Gross domestic product provides a measure of the production in the economy.  A 
significant proportion of that production is attributable to firms.  It is therefore reasonable 
to expect that expectations about future production, as reflected in aggregate asset prices, 
would bear some relationship to gross domestic product. 
 
Figure 2 from Diamond (1999), reproduced below, shows the ratio of market value of US 
stocks to US gross domestic product over the last seventy years.  Like the price-earnings 
ratio, it is now well outside its historic range.  One possible explanation is that there has  
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been a fundamental change in technology so that the marginal product of capital is 
permanently higher than its past series.  This is reflected in talk about the “knowledge 
economy” and a “new era” of technology-driven innovation.  The alternative explanation is 
that the market is experiencing an “irrational exuberance”, Alan Greenspan called it, that 
is bound to be corrected in future. 
 
However, McGrattan and Prescott (2001) cast doubt on whether the market for equity is 
overvalued.  They show that the market value of productive assets is roughly in line with 
the market value of equity. 
 
Capital Market Developments 
Capital markets are not static.  They are continually evolving.  This section examines 
some trends that may affect future required rates of return. 
 
New Institutions 
A major development in investment has been the establishment of mutual funds, in which 
investors pool their resources to acquire a more diversified portfolio at lower cost by taking 
advantage of economies of scale.  Because this reduces the price to individual investors 
of investing in risky assets (otherwise they presumably would not do it), it has been 
suggested that this should lead to a lower equity risk premium in the future.  However, 
although mutual funds have grown significantly in recent years, they still own a relatively 
small proportion of the market (less than 20% of the US market in 1999) and the cost  
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savings do not apply to large investors who have always enjoyed lower charges.   
 
Declining Transaction Costs 
Another trend in capital markets is a decline in transaction costs as trading technology, 
especially over the internet, has developed and deregulation has taken place.
2  This 
applies to both stocks and bonds, but possibly more to stocks, suggesting that both the 
total expected return and the equity risk premium might decline.  Again, however, large 
institutional investors, who make up the bulk of the market, already enjoy low charges so 
this trend would not be likely to have a significant effect on future returns. 
 
Widening Pool of Investors 
Heaton and Lucas (1999) document the increasing participation rates in the US stock 
market over the last decade.  This increase is partly attributed to “baby boomers” entering 
their peak saving years, and also to developments in tax law, pension provision and 
globalisation of capital markets.  Like the other capital market developments discussed 
above, the risk spreading resulting from this greater participation suggests that both the 
total expected return and the equity risk premium might be reduced but, again, the 
increase is primarily for small investors who do not own a large proportion of the market.  
Nonetheless, Siegel (1999) suggests that declining transaction costs and increased 
diversification could have had an effect as great as one to two percentage points on 
expected net returns. 
 
Investor Time Horizons 
Another possible change in capital markets out into the future is that investors’ time 
horizons might change, in aggregate.  How investment horizon should affect risk 
preference is an issue of some debate (see Thorley (1995) for a review.  Bodie (1995) 
provides an analysis using options theory).  However, it is generally observed that, as 
people age, their financial portfolios shift toward less volatile assets.  With a more aged 
population this suggests that there might be generally higher observed risk aversion and 
hence higher equity risk premia in the future.  However, the increase in institutional 
investment might have lengthened the average time horizon.  In short, it is not clear how 
investor time horizons in aggregate might change in future, nor how returns might be 
consequentially affected. 
                                                 
2 Prior to 1975, brokerage commissions on trading individual stocks was set by the New York Stock 
Exchange, and were substantially higher than they are today (Seigel, 1999).  
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Economic Developments 
Low inflation environment 
After an analysis of 34 years data for 20 countries, Lindh and Malmberg (2000) find a 
pattern of inflation effects consistent with the hypothesis that increases in the population 
of net savers dampen inflation, whereas especially the younger retirees fan inflation as 
they start consuming out of accumulated pension claims.  If this result has any predictive 
power, it suggests that inflation would be higher over the next few decades.  This would 
be reflected in expected nominal rates of return. 
 
However, others believe that we are entering a permanent low-inflation environment that 
is different from historical experience, and with significant implications for pensions and 
other products that are priced on the basis of expected long-term returns (Meredith et al., 
2000). 
 
Future GDP growth 
Labour force growth is expected to slow over the next few decades as the population 
ages.  With a constant or declining labour productivity, this implies that economic growth 
will be lower in future than now. 
 
This lower economic growth may or may not flow through to a lower marginal product of 
capital and lower returns.  Diamond (1999) uses a standard (Solow) model of economic 
growth to show that slower long-run economic growth with a constant savings rate will 
yield a lower marginal product of capital.  However, he also notes that savings and growth 
are related, with slower economic growth resulting in lower savings, which could preserve 
stability in the rate of return since in his Solow model, low savings increase the marginal 
product of capital. 
 
Globalisation 
As globalisation of markets, particularly capital markets, gathers pace, country-specific 
effects will be increasingly dominated by worldwide trends.  As a result, the specific 
conditions in a particular country, for example its demographic structure, will come to have 
less of an effect on investment returns in, and to, that country than would the global 
demographic trend.  
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Demographics 
Anecdotal accounts from the US of the effect of the “baby boom” generation on house 
prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s as they moved through their “home-buying 
years”, and more recently on stock market values as they move through their “peak saving 
years”, have led to wide speculation that asset values will decline over the next few 
decades as the baby boomers start to dis-save to finance their retirement years.  Poterba 
(1988) investigates the empirical association between population age structure and the 
returns on stocks and bonds using historical data from the US over the past seventy 
years.  He does not find any robust relationship between demographic structure and asset 
returns.  There are several factors that could weaken the relationship between age 
structure and asset returns: 
 
•  Changes in age structure could affect asset demand, and thereby asset returns, but 
these might be too small to be detected amongst other shocks to asset markets.  
Strong serial dependence in age structures also limits the power of statistical tests. 
•  The development of financial markets in currently “emerging markets” might dilute 
the effect of changing age structures.  Seigel (1998, p. 41) states:  “The developing 
world emerges as the answer to the age mismatch of the industrialized economies.  
If their progress continues, they will sell goods to the baby boomers and thereby 
acquire the buying power to purchase their assets.”  However, a World Bank study 
(Holzmann, 2000) concludes that investments in emerging markets might help at the 
margin but are unlikely to be a major factor. 
•  Changes in government social policy, particularly retirement income provision and 
health insurance, could affect saving rates across age cohorts.  For example, 
Poterba (1998) suggests: “If government provision of retirement income declines, 
this may stimulate saving among younger workers, thereby changing the current 
age-wealth accumulation profile.” 
•  If the market is made by investors with rational expectations, any predictable effect 
of a changing age structure should already be incorporated in the prices of financial 
instruments, at least to some extent. 
•  Individuals tend to shift from investments in equities to investments in less risky 
financial assets, such as government bonds, as they age.
3  This might lead to 
depressed returns for the baby boom generation as they sell their equities all at 
once to a smaller follow-on generation.  Brooks (2000) demonstrates this effect in 
theory using a neo-classical growth model with three overlapping generations 
(children, working parents and retired).  However, this effect is mollified in the 
existence of publicly-funded pay-as-you-go income provision.  The real-world effect 
would also be expected to be weaker because there are more than three 
overlapping generations trading with each other and wealth is not evenly distributed 
                                                 
3 The usual explanation for this, that people become more risk averse as they age, is not very 
satisfactory and has led to a long  debate about the merits of time-diversification.  A more 
satisfactory explanation is that individuals run down their implicit holding of a non-traded asset, 
human capital, over their life cycle, so the move toward bonds is a rebalancing of their overall 




Another feature of the demographic forecasts is that a permanent change in the age 
structure of the population in developed countries is expected to take place this century.  It 
is not simply a case of a post-war “baby boom” generation going through life.  Fertility has 
declined, parents are having children later in life, and longevity has increased.  Together, 
these factors signal a permanent shift to an older population in future.  It is not obvious 
what effect these changes will have on investment returns, particularly as these effects 
will vary across socio-economic groups.  For example, increased longevity might increase 
incentives to save in anticipation of a longer retirement period (thus decreasing required 
rates of return), however this might have little effect on the wealthy (to whom the bulk of 
private saving can be attributed) if they are already saving more than enough to meet their 
lifetime needs. 
Conclusion to Appendix 
Small differences in expected returns can have significant effects on long-term wealth as 
returns compound over many years.  This appendix has reviewed a range of approaches 
that have been taken to assessing likely future expected returns. 
 
While there seems to be a consensus that returns in future in both bond and equity 
markets are expected to be lower than in the recent past, there is not a unanimous view 
as to how much lower they will be, nor what will be the main drivers of expected returns 
over the long-term. 